A principal speci…es time paths of knowledge transfer, e¤ort provision, and task allocation for a cash-constrained apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In the optimal contract the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and by working ine¢ ciently hard. The apprentice can work on both knowledge-complementary and knowledge-independent tasks. We study how the nature of the production technology in ‡uences the length of the optimal contract and its mix of e¤ort types, and discuss the e¤ect of regulatory limits on how hard the apprentice can work and how long the apprenticeship can last.
Introduction
Both in medieval times and today, employees at the beginning of their careers (e.g. apprentice bakers, prep cooks, law …rm associates, medical residents, post-docs) go through a stage where they acquire knowledge and training from their employers but do enough work that the employer gains a surplus. This raises the questions of whether the employers will specify longer training periods than strictly needed for the desired knowledge transfer, and more e¤ort than would be socially optimal.
In this paper, we study the design of optimal (pro…t-maximizing) careers by a principal with commitment power, who can specify time paths of knowledge transfer, e¤ort provision, and task allocation subject to the no-servitude condition that the agent is free to leave at any time. We assume that the agent is cash constrained, and so cannot simply purchase knowledge from the principal. Instead, the agent will undergo a form of apprenticeship, where they work hard for relatively low cash payments to compensate the principal for training them. Following Becker (1964) , we are interested in environments in which the knowledge that the agent wishes to acquire takes the form of general human capital: much of what bakers, doctors, and lawyers learn in their early years is fully applicable in other …rms. An important feature of our model is that the principal's ability to extract payment for transferring general human capital is constrained by the apprentice's ability to leave the …rm once trained without paying the principal back. 1 In our model, the agent's e¤ort can be split between two tasks: A "skilled task" whose productivity rises with the agent's knowledge, such as writing legal briefs, and an "unskilled task" whose productivity is independent of the agent's knowledge level -this could either be menial work such as making co¤ee or photocopies, or fairly sophisticated work that does not however use the knowledge that the agent is working to receive. We …nd that the optimal contract for the principal is ine¢ cient both due to slow training (it would be socially e¢ cient to transfer all the knowledge at once) and because the agent will work ine¢ ciently hard to compensate the principal for this training.
The degree of e¤ort distortion at any given time is determined by the speed at which the principal wishes to transfer knowledge, with greater e¤ort corresponding to faster transfer. Because the time spent on early transfers delays the later ones, the principal becomes in less of a rush as the contract unfolds and so the transfer slows and e¤ort 1 A related literature studies borrowing by cash constrained agents who are free to walk away with the …rm's capital -e.g. Thomas and Worrall (1994) , Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) . becomes less distorted. The overall length of the apprenticeship is in turn governed by the degree of e¤ort distortion and allocation of e¤ort across tasks. If only unskilled e¤ort is distorted above the e¢ cient level the apprenticeship lasts 1 r years, where r is the annual interest rate, regardless of the degree of e¤ort distortion. If skilled e¤ort is distorted the apprenticeship lasts less than 1 r years, with a greater distortion in skilled e¤ort leading to a shorter apprenticeship. Because the optimal contract speci…es ine¢ ciently high e¤ort together with ine¢ ciently lengthy training, government regulation may in principal be desirable. In some (but not all) cases, regulations that either cap the agent's maximum e¤ort or limit the duration of the apprenticeship can raise surplus; these two policies combined can do even better.
There is an extensive literature focusing on worker training with general human capital. This literature has suppressed not only the time path of e¤ort but the e¤ort choice itself. In addition, Katz and Ziderman (1990) , Acemoglu (1997) , Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) , Malcomson et al. (2003) all assume that knowledge transfer is a one-time instantaneous event. These papers focus on how market frictions may allow training to occur in equilibrium even despite the di¢ culties in appropriating the gains from providing general knowledge. Garicano and Rayo (2017) also suppresses e¤ort choice but, as we do, allows for gradual knowledge transfer and shows that even absent market frictions, the principal can pro…t by arti…cially stretching the knowledge transfer over time. 2 There is also an extensive literature on the e¤ect of uncertainty about the worker's ability, which can lead to either more or less e¤ort than in the …rst best, as in Landers et al. (1996) , Holmstrom (1999), Dewatripont et al. (1999) , Barlevy and Neil (2016) , Bonatti and Hörner (2017) , and Cisternas (2017) . All of this work abstracts from worker training and knowledge transfer.
The excessive e¤ort paths predicted by our model are consistent with the well-known empirical pattern that young professionals frequently face long hours and heavy workloads (e.g. Coleman and Pencavel, 1993 , Landers et al., 1996 , Barlevy and Neal, 2016 to the point where industry observers have expressed concern with their work-life balance. 3 There is also empirical support for our …nding that, especially early in their careers, 2 Hörner and Skrzypacz (2016) study gradual information revelation by a privately informed agent about her competence; their model has neither e¤ort nor human capital. 3 A Financial Times article notes: "There is no simple …x for an entrenched culture of overwork at professional services …rms. The fact that an entry-level analyst at a Wall Street bank is required to sacri…ce his or her personal life to the job -sitting at a desk until dawn, eating order-in food and correcting invisible errors in spreadsheets -has been built into the system" (Gapper, 2014). workers are commonly instructed to perform lengthy "menial" work unrelated to the skills they wish to acquire (e.g. Maister, 1993, UK Dept. for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013).
Medical residencies, a form of mandatory apprenticeship for young M.D.s, provide an illustration. As noted by Park (2017) , they are "structured to serve the dual, often dueling, aims of training the profession's next generation and minding the hospital's labor needs", with hospitals constantly struggling to "stay on the right side of the boundary between training and taking advantage of residents." 4 In the U.S., residents typically endure a grueling 80-hour work week; in contrast, less than a quarter of fully trained doctors work for more than 60 hours a week (e.g. Landrigan et al., 2004 , American Medical Association, 2015 . A signi…cant portion of a resident's shift is usually spent on menial tasks, known in the medical profession as "scut work," such as inserting IV lines, wheeling patients around, and performing lengthy administrative work, which are all valuable to the hospital but provide limited learning opportunities for the apprentices (Jauhar, 2015) . 5 Apprenticeships date back to at least the European trade guilds starting in the 12th century, where they served as the main source of training for artisans and merchants (Jovinelly and Netelkos, 2007) . At the same time, they gave rise to opportunities for exploitation: "Master craftsmen and tradesmen took in young learners and gave them menial tasks that make …ling and photocopying look plush" (Spradlin, 2009 ). Adam Smith considered industrial-revolution apprenticeships, which usually lasted seven years, to be excessively long and poorly paid. He viewed this arrangement as a response to the agent's liquidity constraints: "During the continuance of the apprenticeship, the whole labour of the apprentice belongs to his master. In the mean time he must, in many cases, be maintained by his parents or relations, and in almost all cases must be cloathed by them"... "They who cannot give money [to the master], give time, or become bound for more than the usual number of years; a consideration which... is always disadvantageous to the apprentice"(Smith , 1872, p. 93).
During the industrial revolution, long hours were commonplace and even a cause for 4 Indeed, "[l]ong hours and hard work have been features of medical training since the modern residency program had its beginnings at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore in the late 19th century"(Jauhar, 2015, New York Times). 5 Schwartz et al. (1992) …nd that in-hospital hours of surgical residents averaged 98 per week, with hours slightly declining over time from around 100 hours for interns (…rst-year residents), 97 for junior residents, and 95 for chief residents. About 20 hours a week were spent on menial tasks. public concern. Lane (1996) notes that a 14-hour workday was typical, with frequent cases of even longer hours: "Shoemakers also theoretically worked a 14-hour day, but
[apprentice] George Herbert's memories recorded that he often worked 'for three weeks together from three or four in the morning till ten at night'", and yet a legal threat by Herbert's father went nowhere because "withholding instruction was a serious threat to the apprentice"(p. 85). Just as with current-day apprenticeships, 17th and 18th century apprenticeships commonly began with a period of menial work: Ayres (2014) notes, "In acquiring a craft skill a youth was put through an almost military discipline. After one or two years engaged in menial tasks: fetching and carrying, sweeping the workshop ‡oor or lighting the stove, an apprentice woodcarver might be granted the privilege of learning to sharpen tools"(p. 350).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, Sections 3 and 4 derive the solution, Section 5 presents comparative statics, and Section 6 contains extensions. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Model
A principal (she) and an agent (they) interact over an in…nite horizon. Both players have quasilinear utility in money and discount future payo¤s at rate r. Time t runs continuously. At time t; the agent combines a stock of knowledge X t 2 0; X and two sorts of e¤ort a t ; b t to produce output y t : E¤ort a t is "skilled," meaning that its productivity is increasing in the agent's knowledge X t . E¤ort b t is "unskilled," meaning that its productivity is independent of X t . Let l t := a t + b t denote total e¤ort. We assume that both a t and b t are non-negative and l t is bounded above by a constant, which we normalize to 1.
Thus total output y t is given by
Exerting e¤ort l t imposes cost c t := c (l t ) 0 on the agent. We assume that f is strictly increasing in knowledge, f and g are non-decreasing in e¤ort, c is strictly increasing, and all three functions are twice di¤erentiable. Let v (X) := max a;b 0 [f (X; a) + g (b) c (a + b)] denote …rst-best surplus given X. Since f is strictly increasing in X; so is v. We assume throughout that lim X!1 v (X) = 1:
The agent starts with some exogenous stock of knowledge X 2 0; X : The agent's stock of knowledge can never decrease, and the only way it can increase is by transfers from the principal, who is able to costlessly and instantaneously increase the agent's knowledge to any level up to X. 6 The agent has no other way to obtain knowledge. As a result, the principal can select any weakly increasing function X t with range in X; X :
Let X 1 := lim t!1 X t : When X 1 is reached in …nite time, we say that the agent graduates at time T = inf ft : X t X 1 g : Otherwise, we set T = 1 and say that the agent never graduates.
The agent has access to the same output technology when working for the expert and when working on their own. The agent also has access to an alternate employment that pays v; with 0 < v < v X ; so that total surplus is maximized by fully training the agent. As a result, if the agent walks away with knowledge X; they obtain instantaneous surplus max fv; v (X)g ; and since their knowledge will be constant from then on, their outside option at date t is 1 r max fv; v (X)g : In addition, the agent has access to a savings account that pays interest r; but has no capital up-front and has no ability to borrow so they cannot purchase knowledge from the expert at date 0.
At time 0; the principal o¤ers the agent an employment contract, denoted S = (T; fX t ; a t ; b t ; w t g T t=0 ), consisting of a graduation date T and a path that speci…es for each t 2 [0; T ] a knowledge stock X t , e¤ort levels (a t ; b t ), and a money transfer w t from principal to agent, which we call a wage. Between dates 0 and T; all output net of wages belongs to the principal. After date T; the agent works on their own and keeps all output. 7 While the principal can commit to this contract, the agent can walk away at any time; if the agent does so, the principal does not hire them back.
Given contract S; the principal's and agent's continuation values from date t T 6 This can be thought of as an idealized version of a model where the principal can costlessly transfer a ‡ow of knowledge at a very high rate. 7 Contracts where the agent continues to work for the principal after T are weakly dominated because once the knowledge transfer has ended, the agent demands wages at least equal to output. Contracts where the agent works on their own during some periods prior to T are strictly dominated because this delays the principal's pro…t ‡ow. onward are
where 1 r v (X T ) is the "prize"received by the agent upon graduation. The principal can select any contract she desires subject to two constraints. First, a participation constraint for the agent requiring that, at each date t T; the agent's continuation value is at least as high as their outside option:
Second, a liquidity constraint for the agent requiring that, up to any given date t T , the agent's cumulative earnings are non-negative in present value:
This constraint captures the assumption that the agent starts the relationship with no money and cannot borrow.
The principal's problem is
subject to (2) and (3) and subject to a t ; b t 0; a t + b t 1; and X t 2 X; X non-decreasing in t. We say that a contract is optimal if it is a solution to this maximization problem.
Note that we can model situations where the principal must pay the agent a strictly positive subsistence wage with the same formalism: if the required wage is w, we can de…ne b f := f w, b y := y w, and b v := v w and model the situation using (1), (2), and (3). To allow for this interpretation of the model, we will allow b y and b v to be negative. Thus the wages w t in our model should be thought of as wages in excess of the minimum, though we will simply call them "wages" in what follows. Note that with this interpretation of v; we should not expect the constraint v X > v to be satis…ed when w is very large.
Preliminaries
In Section 3.1 we derive general properties that any undominated contract must satisfy, without yet verifying that an optimal contract exists. In Section 3.2 we use these properties to formulate the principal's problem as one of optimal control and then verify that a maximum in (4) is indeed attained. Section 4 uses additional assumptions to show that the optimal contract is unique and then to characterize its length and e¤ort path. 1. The principal can obtain a strictly positive pro…t by contracting with the agent.
General properties of undominated contracts
2. Any contract with W 1 > 0 is strictly dominated by a contract with 0 net payment, and any contract where the agent does not acquire all of the principal's knowledge in …nite time is strictly dominated by a contract where they do. Moreover, it is without loss to require that w t = 0 at all times t:
To gain intuition for the …rst part of this lemma, note that the principal can train the agent to an intermediate level X 0 2 (X; X) such that v(X 0 ) > v; and induce them to work at zero wages for some (possibly short) period of time in exchange for the remaining knowledge at the end of the contract.
To gain intuition for the second part of this lemma, recall that the e¢ cient outcome would be for the principal to immediately transfer all of her knowledge to the agent so that the agent could work on their own. Because the agent is credit-constrained this does not occur, and instead the agent works for the principal while being trained. The key to the lemma is that any contract with W 1 > 0 can be improved by a contract with an earlier graduation date, the same e¤ort path up to graduation, 0 wages, and the same initial value for the agent. Because the new contract replaces wages with a more valuable …nal reward, the agent is less tempted to walk away while being trained, and so the new contract meets all of the participation constraints. Then because the two sides have the same discount rate, and it is e¢ cient to transfer knowledge earlier, the new 0-wage contract has higher joint surplus, and since the agent is indi¤erent between the two contracts the new one makes the principal strictly better o¤. Full knowledge transfer is optimal for a similar reason. Moreover, it is without loss to set wages to be zero at all times because there is no gain to the principal initially paying the agent money only to ask for it back later.
The next lemma states two additional simplifying properties that we can impose when looking for the optimal contract: If the participation constraints do not hold with equality the principal can do better by increasing X t until they do, and the principal prefers to allocate total e¤ort l t = a t + b t between the two tasks to maximize output.
Let y(X; l) := max a2[0;l] f (X; a)+g (l a) denote the maximum possible output given knowledge and e¤ort levels (X; l):
Lemma 2 Any contract is weakly dominated by a contract that at all times sets the agent's participation constraint to hold with equality and allocates total e¤ort l t = a t + b t across tasks so as to maximize output, so that y t (X t ; a t ; b t ) = y(X t ; l t ). 9
For intuition, note that since output is strictly increasing in X t ; and knowledge transfer is costless, the principal wishes to raise X t to the point where the agent's participation constraint holds with equality. In addition, since the allocation of total e¤ort across tasks does not a¤ect the agent's utility, it is optimal for the expert to choose an allocation that maximizes output. Notice also that any contract with v > v(X t ) for some t can be improved by increasing X t to v 1 (v) over the time interval where v > v(X t ); as a result, we may assume without loss that v (X) v and write the agent's ex-ante outside option more compactly as 1 r v (X). The principal's problem therefore simpli…es to selecting a …nite graduation date T and time paths of knowledge and total e¤ort before this date. Her problem is
subject to
and subject to 0 l t 1; X t 2 X; X , and X t non-decreasing in t. We denote the solution to this problem by (T ; fX t ; l t g T t=0 ):
Proposition 1 Every undominated contract is renegotiation proof: It maximizes pro…ts from every (t; X t ) that is reached along the optimal path.
This result shows that even though the principal has commitment power, she does not make commitments that she would later prefer to undo. For this reason it is su¢ cient for the principal to be able to commit to spot contracts. 10 This is because of the agent's dynamic participation constraint, which Lemma 2 showed is always binding. Thus, the current stock of knowledge determines the path of future e¤ort and the speed at which knowledge is transferred. We use this observation later to provide intuition for the optimal e¤ort and knowledge paths. Note that at this point we have not yet proven that an optimal contract exists; we will do so in the next section.
Optimal control
It is convenient to state the principal's problem as an optimal control problem in which the principal's control variables are the agent's e¤ort levels fl t g T t=0 and the choice of terminal 10 In a discrete time model it would be su¢ cient for the principal to commit at the beginning of each period to transfer knowledge at the end of it, conditional on the agent exerting the agreed e¤ort. time T; the state variable is the agent's continuation value, measured as a ‡ow payo¤,
, and the agent's knowledge stock X t is given by
so that the agent's participation constraint is met with equality. We assume that l t has bounded variation.
Recall that the principal is able to instantaneously increase X to any level no greater than X: Total surplus would be maximized if the principal instantaneously transferred all her knowledge to the agent, that is if X 0 = X, but in that case the principal would get no bene…t from the knowledge transfer. As we will see, in some cases the principal does want to make a smaller instantaneous knowledge gift to the agent, but this will only occur at the initial time.
Note that the state equation u t = r [u t + c (l t )] says that the value of the knowledge gained at time t equals the total opportunity cost of working for the principal, which includes both the labor cost c and the loss from postponing the outside option.
The optimal control problem is:
Let t denote the co-state variable, form the Hamiltonian H = e rt y ( (u t ) ; l t ) t u t ; and adjoin the e¤ort constraints with multipliers t ; t to form the Lagrangian L =
Lemma 3 A solution to problem (6) exists. Moreover, the following system is necessary for optimality:
Expression (7) contains the state and co-state evolution equations; (8) contains the …rst-order condition for l t ; (9) contains the complementary slackness conditions for the Lagrange multipliers t ; t ; and (10) contains the transversal conditions for the terminal time T; where 0 acts as a multiplier for the ex-ante participation constraint u 0 v (X) :
In later sections we impose additional structure on the production functions f; g that guarantee that the solution to the necessary conditions is unique and hence su¢ cient.
We solve the optimal control problem by starting from an arbitrary terminal time T ,
where the agent has all knowledge so that the state is u T = v X , and then running time in reverse. At each time, the state determines the optimal e¤ort level, and the state and e¤ort level combined determine the time derivative of the state. As time moves backward, the state v (X t ) continues to fall until either: (1) the state reaches the agent's ex-ante outside ‡ow payo¤ v (X) ; in which case v (X 0 ) = v (X) and there is no initial knowledge gift, or (2) the principal would rather give the agent an initial knowledge gift and start employing them at the current time instead of having a longer apprenticeship with an initially less trained apprentice.
Solution
We begin by imposing further assumptions on the output and cost functions. As we will see, these assumptions guarantee that the optimal contract is unique and that agent exerts positive e¤ort throughout the apprenticeship.
Assumption 1
1. f Xa > 0 and f aa 0; g 0 > 0 and g 00 0; either f aa < 0 or g 00 < 0, and lim X!1 f (X; 1) = 1.
2. c 0 ; c 00 > 0; c 0 (0) = 0; and c 0 (1) > @ @l y(X; 1):
Let l F B (X) := arg max l fy(X; l) c(l)g be the …rst-best level of total e¤ort, which is unique from Assumption 1, and let a F B (X) := arg max a f (X; a) + g(l F B (X) a)
be the corresponding …rst-best level of skilled e¤ort, which is also unique. Note that lim X!1 v (X) = 1 as per our maintained assumption. Note also that the e¢ cient level of total e¤ort l F B (X) is strictly positive and less than 1. Finally, let a (X; l) := arg max a2[0;l] ff (X; a) + g(l a)g denote the output-maximizing skilled e¤ort given knowledge and total e¤ort levels (X; l) ; and note that @ @l y(X; l) = maxff a (X; a); g 0 (l a)g; so in particular @y @l exists. Now de…ne the knowledge premium given knowledge X and skilled e¤ort a as
:
Because f X X; a F B (X) = v 0 (X) from the envelope theorem, this premium measures the marginal impact of knowledge on the agent's productivity inside the relationship relative to its impact on the agent's outside option. As we shall see, the knowledge premium plays a central role in determining both the optimal e¤ort levels and the optimal contract length.
The next theorem characterizes the e¤ort and knowledge paths in an optimal contract.
Theorem 1
1. The optimal e¤ort path is e¢ cient at the terminal time T , and exceeds the e¢ cient level at all earlier times, that is l T = l F B X and l t > l F B (X t ) for t < T :
2. Moreover the optimal knowledge and total e¤ort paths uniquely satisfy, for all t T ;
and
where v (X T ) = v X and = (X ; a (X ; l )) is the knowledge premium at :
Equation (11) is the state equation. In economic terms it states that the present value of the knowledge acquired at date t must equal the agent's total opportunity cost of working for the expert. Equation (12) characterizes the ratio c 0 =(@y=@l); which equals 1 in the …rst-best case. Absent an upper bound on the agent's total e¤ort the principal
; when this is not feasible she sets it as high as possible.
By way of intuition, consider the following heuristic derivation of the optimal time path of knowledge transfers and e¤ort distortions. Recall from Proposition 1 that the optimal choice of l and dt depend only on the stock of knowledge X X that remains to be sold. Suppose the agent already has knowledge X and consider the problem of selling them a discrete increment of knowledge of value 1, that is 1 where [v(X) + c(l)]dt is the agent's total opportunity cost of working for the principal over dt. This constraint, which causes the principal to internalize the agent's e¤ort cost, tells us that a higher e¤ort ‡ow must be accompanied by a quicker sale (a smaller dt).
Note next that if the principal planned to sell knowledge now and then sell no further knowledge, it would be optimal to set l = l F B (X), which maximizes ‡ow surplus. To see why, observe that the principal's gain from this sale is
and that the right hand side of this equality equals 1 when l = l F B (X) and is smaller for other values of l because total surplus y c is strictly concave.
When instead the principal plans to sell additional knowledge, she is in more of a rush to complete the sale, because a shorter dt means a shorter delay until she can begin collecting pro…ts from her subsequent sales. As a result, she sets dt smaller than the above baseline and is able to ask for e¤ort higher than …rst best.
Note, …nally, that the greater the agent's current knowledge X, the less knowledge the principal has left to sell, and the smaller her gain from shortening dt. As a result, the sale of the next increment of knowledge is less rushed and the e¤ort distortion, by necessity, falls. When the principal makes her …nal sale she is in no rush at all; therefore, she sets e¤ort to …rst best and stretches dt out as long as needed to extract all rents from the agent.
The target distortion 1 r
in equation (12) measures the degree to which the expert is in a rush. This target distortion is equal to 1 when t = T (and so e¤ort is …rst best) and it grows as t falls because the principal has more knowledge left to sell. In addition, for any given t; the target distortion is greater the greater are the future knowledge premia. This makes future knowledge transfers more pro…table, and so the principal is more eager to carry them out. Note, …nally, that whenever the target distortion is large enough, the principal sets l t equal to its upper bound.
We are now ready to characterize the (unique) optimal initial knowledge level and contract length. where t = (X t ; a t ): The …rst case arises when the principal's total knowledge X exceeds a …nite cuto¤ b X; the second case arises otherwise.
To provide intuition for the knowledge gift, we revisit our heuristic derivation. Let X; X denote the principal's optimized continuation payo¤ when the agent has knowledge X and total knowledge is X: This payo¤ is decreasing in X and increasing in X: Now suppose the agent has knowledge X < X and, as before, consider the problem of trans- The greater X is, the greater the principal's rush to complete the transfer of dX, and therefore the greater the desired e¤ort l: And indeed when X is su¢ ciently large, the principal sets l equal to its upper bound. Once this occurs the principal's choice of dt maximizes y (X; 1) dt + (1 rdt) X + dX; X subject to 1 [v(X) + c(1)] dt: Since the objective is linear in dt; when X is high enough or X is low enough that r X + dX; X exceeds y (X; 1) ; the principal sets dt = 0 and therefore instantly gifts dX to the agent. In particular, the principal will gift knowledge until the agent has knowledge X 0 such that r X 0 + dX; X equals y (X 0 ; 1) ; in limit as dX = 0 this becomes r X 0 ; X = y (X 0 ; 1) : Consequently, since all such gifts occur at time 0; the optimal initial knowledge X 0 is the unique solution to
Notice that since is increasing in X, the initial gift is increasing in X as well. We also learn that the knowledge cuto¤ b X in the theorem uniquely satis…es X; b X = 1 r y (X; 1) : Finally, when the principal's total knowledge is below this cuto¤, the agent's ex-ante participation constraint U 0 1 r v (X) binds and the agent starts working with knowledge X 0 equal to their knowledge endowment X: Since the optimal contract is renegotiation proof (Proposition 1), increasing X is like starting the contract at a later date. Thus, when the agent's knowledge endowment is higher the contract becomes shorter: since the principal has less knowledge to sell, she sells it more quickly and makes the agent work less hard for it.
To understand why the unconstrained apprenticeship length satis…es r R T 0 t dt = 1, consider a contract with an arbitrary length T and …rst-best e¤ort at the terminal time. Now suppose the principal has the agent work a bit longer at the end of the apprenticeship (over time dT ) so that the principal gains 1 in present value, namely, e rT y X; l F B X dT = 1:
Since this change lowers the agent's continuation value throughout the apprenticeship, to prevent them from walking away the principal needs to lower the agent's knowledge at each t. Speci…cally, to keep the participation constraint satis…ed with equality, for all 0 < t T the principal must set dX t so that
and so dX t = re rt =f X X t ; a F B (X t ) : The overall loss in output due to this reduction in knowledge is
Since a larger T means that output must drop over a longer period of time, this loss is increasing in T: It follows that the optimal length T sets this loss equal to the original gain of 1:
Recall that the unconstrained e¤ort level is given by c 0 (lt) @ @l y(Xt;lt) = 1 r
Then since r R T 0 t dt = 1, the time-0 target e¤ort distortion in Theorem 1 is in…nitely large. If this were feasible, the principal would prefer to ask the agent to initially work in…nitely hard for an in…nitely small length of time to pay for the initial knowledge transfer, but as this is not possible the principal instead transfers some initial knowledge for free. Notice also that the contract becomes longer as r falls. This result, obtained by Garicano and Rayo (2017) for the special case with zero e¤ort, follows from the fact that when players become more patient knowledge becomes more valuable for the agent, so the agent is willing to work longer to acquire it. This result is immediate: e¢ cient skilled e¤ort at time t means that t = 1: The optimal length therefore satis…es r R T 0 dt = rT = 1: Conversely, since total e¤ort is never ine¢ ciently low and e¤ort is always allocated e¢ ciently, t is never less than 1, so if it is ever greater than 1 we have R 1 r 0 t dt > 1 r so T < 1 r :
Comparative Statics
Here we study how the relative productivity of the two tasks and the curvature of the cost function impact the agreement. We begin by considering the two special cases where the agent devotes all their e¤ort to one of the tasks. We then turn to the intermediate case where the agent works on both tasks.
A. Unskilled e¤ort only. Suppose f a (X; 0) < g 0 (1) so at each time the agent exerts e¤ort only on the unskilled task. Suppose further that X is large enough that the agent's ex-ante participation constraint is slack. Since at all times a t = a F B (X t ) = 0; the knowledge premia t are all 1; and the optimal contract length is T = 1 r from Corollary 1 (for example, when the annual interest rate is 5%; T is 20 years). Theorem 1 then implies that at all times before the terminal time, unskilled e¤ort exceeds the …rst best, and satis…es
Thus e¤ort weakly falls over time, strictly so whenever e¤ort is below its upper bound 1. Figure 1 .A depicts an optimal contract. The optimal e¤ort distortion balances a loss in instantaneous surplus against a higher rate of knowledge transfer. Early on, when the principal is in most of a rush to transfer knowledge, e¤ort equals its upper bound.
Note that if the maximum feasible e¤ort were reduced to b F B the agent would endure an apprenticeship that is equally long (Corollary 1) but less costly per unit of time, which means the agent could be granted more knowledge throughout. Thus while overworking the agent allows the principal to extract more rent from the agent, this wastes e¤ort and lowers the agent's productivity, causing social surplus to fall. Figure 1 .B illustrates how the contract changes with the curvature of the cost function c. 11 As c becomes more linear ( falls) e¤ort above …rst best becomes less wasteful and therefore closer to a money transfer. As a result, the principal is willing to impose a higher e¤ort cost on the agent. This raises the principal's payo¤, but makes the apprenticeship 11 As varies, , and the maximum feasible e¤ort vary so that b F B ; c b F B and the maximum feasible e¤ort cost are held constant. 
Effort cost
Outside option more aversive to the agent, causing both the knowledge path and social surplus to fall.
B. Skilled e¤ort only. Suppose f a (X; 1) > g 0 (0); so at each time the agent exerts e¤ort only on the skilled task. Theorem 1 implies that at all times before the terminal time, skilled e¤ort exceeds the …rst best, and satis…es
Through the lifetime of the contract the e¤ort distortion falls because f Xa > 0; X t grows, and r R T t d falls. However since the e¢ cient e¤ort is increasing over time, the optimal e¤ort level is either weakly decreasing or non-monotone depending on the details of f and c. 12 Corollary 1 implies that the optimal apprenticeship length is always strictly less than 1 r : This is because the complementarity between e¤ort and knowledge means that increasing e¤ort past the …rst-best level also increases the principal's incentive to train the agent. In contrast to the case with only unskilled e¤ort, where the principal extracts rents from the agent by combining overwork with a lengthy apprenticeship in which training is initially very low, here overwork and slow training are con ‡icting sources of rents. Thus the optimal apprenticeship length is a compromise between raising the marginal productivity of apprentice's e¤ort and keeping the apprentice longer. Figure 2 .A depicts an optimal contract. As in the unskilled case, as time passes and the principal is in less of a rush to train the agent, the e¤ort distortion falls. In the example in the …gure, because of a relatively strong complementarity between knowledge and e¤ort, the contract is substantially shorter than in the unskilled case. Note that if the maximum feasible e¤ort were reduced to a F B X the agent would endure an apprenticeship that is less costly per unit of time, but since the marginal value of knowledge falls, the principal would also make the apprenticeship longer. Thus overwork in the skilled task allows the principal to extract rents from the agent but has the positive countervailing e¤ect of shortening the apprenticeship. Consequently, a ban on overwork (that is, a cap of a t a F B (X)) can either help or hurt the agent depending on the details of the technology. Figure 2 .B illustrates how the contract changes with the curvature of the cost function c. 13 As in the unskilled case, as c becomes more linear ( falls) so that e¤ort is closer to 12 We can show by example that each case can occur. 13 As in …gure 1.B, when varies, , and the maximum feasible e¤ort vary so that a F B X , a money transfer, the principal is willing to impose a higher e¤ort cost on the agent.
This raises the principal's payo¤ and, unlike in the unskilled case, it also shortens the apprenticeship. In the example in the …gure, this positive countervailing e¤ect is strong enough that the agent's payo¤ grows as well.
C. Both e¤orts. Here we specialize to the case where unskilled e¤ort has constant returns, namely g(b) = qb for some constant q > 0: Constant returns imply that whenever the principal speci…es positive e¤ort on both tasks, the marginal productivity of each task
is q = f a (X t ; a t ), which for any given X t pins down a t :
As time goes by and the skilled task becomes more productive, the optimal contract in general goes through three regimes: First, over an initial (possible empty) time interval (0; t 1 ) skilled e¤ort is e¢ cient (possibly zero) and unskilled e¤ort is ine¢ ciently high. To characterize the optimal contract length, we de…ne the threshold b q = f a (X; b a) for b a = arg max a f (X; a) c (a) : When q b q the unskilled task is su¢ ciently productive that only regime 1 occurs. In this case, as in the case where only unskilled e¤ort is used, the unconstrained apprenticeship length is 1 r : When instead q < b q the unskilled task is su¢ ciently unproductive that regime 3 is always non-empty. In this case, as in the case when only skilled e¤ort is used, the unconstrained apprenticeship length is strictly c a F B X and the maximum feasible e¤ort cost are held constant. 14 In regime 1, f a X t ; a F B (X t ) q; whereas in regimes 2 and 3, f a X t ; a F B (X t ) > q: Moreover, in regimes 1 and 2, f a (X t ; a t ) q; whereas in regime 3, f a (X t ; a t ) > q: That the optimal contract in general goes through these regimes follows from the fact that total e¤ort is no lower than …rst best, X t is increasing over time, f Xa > 0, and e¤ort is allocated e¢ ciently between the two tasks. 15 See www.micheleroux.co.uk/working.html. Such patterns extend well beyond the food industry. less than 1 r : Notice that regimes 1 and 2 are especially damaging to the agent because the overwork in the unskilled task does not have the positive countervailing e¤ect of shortening the apprenticeship.
Extensions

Regulating apprenticeships
Say that a contract is Pareto-e¢ cient if it maximizes the principal's payo¤ for a given payo¤ of the agent, over all contracts that satisfy the agent's participation and liquidity constraints, and otherwise say the contract is Pareto-dominated. Because each claim in the proof of Lemmas 1 and 2 shows that a contract that does not have the stated properties is Pareto-dominated by one that does, it follows that for each feasible value of the agent's payo¤, there is a Pareto-e¢ cient contract that satis…es the claims of those lemmas. Thus any Pareto-e¢ cient payo¤s ( ; U ) can be implemented by an initial knowledge gift to raise the agent's knowledge to v 1 (rU ); followed by the principal's optimal contract when the agent starts with that knowledge level. Equivalently, regulations can enforce the same result with the combination of a time-varying e¤ort cap and a limit on the duration of the apprenticeship. Neither of these alternatives seems very realistic.
Instead, we now consider a time-invariant cap on the agent's e¤ort, beginning with the case where there is only unskilled e¤ort. Here the principal's optimal contract length (when unconstrained by the agent's initial knowledge) is T = 1=r; independent of the size of the gift. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 1 , when the agent's initial knowledge is low enough that the ex-ante participation constraint does not bind, a time-invariant cap on e¤ort that is weakly above the …rst-best level leaves the contract length unchanged, and leads to a larger knowledge gift, which increases the agent's productivity and so increases social surplus. However, such contracts are typically not Pareto-e¢ cient, because they do not correspond to a knowledge gift followed by the decreasing e¤ort path required by a principal-optimal contract. When instead the agent's initial knowledge is high enough that the agent's ex-ante participation constraint binds, a uniform e¤ort cap leads to a Paretoworse outcome as the agent's equilibrium utility is not changed while the knowledge transfer is slowed.
When the agent only exerts skilled e¤ort, the welfare implications of a uniform e¤ort cap again depend on whether or not the agent's ex-ante participation constraint is slack.
Here, unlike with unskilled e¤ort, the cap has an ambiguous e¤ect when the ex-ante participation constraint is slack. As in the unskilled case excessive e¤ort at any given time damages surplus, but here by raising the knowledge premia, overwork induces the principal to shorten the apprenticeship and therefore transfer knowledge more quickly (see Figure 2 ). When instead the constraint binds, then as in the unskilled case overworking the agent leaves the agent's equilibrium utility una¤ected and reduces the apprenticeship length, and so a uniform e¤ort cap lowers the principal's payo¤ without helping the agent.
Similarly, while a cap on the length of the apprenticeship can raise total surplus, it is not Pareto-e¢ cient (except for the extreme case where the principal is required to give away all of her knowledge at once), as it leads the principal to distort e¤ort even at the terminal date in order to sell her knowledge more quickly. 16 It does however seem plausible that regulations could combine a time-invariant e¤ort cap with a limit on the training period. This will still not lead to Pareto-e¢ cient contracts but (depending on the welfare weights used) can more often lead to higher total surplus, because a cap on contract length limits the principal's ability to ine¢ ciently extend the apprenticeship in response to the e¤ort cap and, at the same time, the cap on e¤ort limits the principal's ability to overwork the agent in response to the cap on contract length.
Training costs
Here we extend the model to include a training cost. Speci…cally, we suppose the principal incurs cost k 0 per unit of value 1 r v (X) acquired by the agent, and so the principal's ‡ow payo¤ is now
This simple functional form allows us to again provide a closed-form solution and obtain clean comparative statics. We assume that k < 1 so that it is e¢ cient to transfer all knowledge, that is, the surplus net of the training cost, v(X) k [v (X) v (X)], is maximized at X. To guarantee positive pro…ts for the expert we assume that the agent's …xed outside option v is no greater than v (X) :
As we now explain, the solution to this problem is qualitatively similar to that of the base model; the main di¤erence is that the training cost causes the principal to slow down training and overwork the agent over a longer period of time. The formal analysis of this claim is derived in Appendix A3; here we summarize the main points.
The …rst thing to note is that the optimal contract continues to satisfy the conclusions of Lemmas 1 and 2, so that no wages are paid, the agent is fully trained in …nite time, the participation constraint holds with equality at all times except perhaps for an initial gift of knowledge, and total e¤ort is allocated e¢ ciently across the two tasks. Moreover, except for why the agent is fully trained, the intuition for these results is the same as in This formula is almost the same condition as in the original model, except that [ t k]
takes the place of t : To understand why this is so, start with an apprenticeship with length T and as we did in the original model suppose the principal has the agent work a bit longer at the end of the apprenticeship, so that the principal gains 1 in present value.
This change lowers the agent's continuation value throughout the apprenticeship, and so the principal needs to lower the agent's knowledge at each t so they do not walk away.
As a result, the principal su¤ers output loss r R T 0 t dt as before, but also postpones some of the training cost, so that from (13) her overall training costs change by
The optimal length sets the output loss net of cost savings, r R T 0 [ t k] dt; equal to 1. Because of the principal's desire to backload the training cost, the apprenticeship lasts longer than in the original model. To illustrate, when the agent exerts unskilled e¤ort only, and so t 1, the optimal unconstrained length is 1 r(1 k) > 1 r . This length is increasing in k because the larger the cost, the more the principal wants to postpone paying it; and is decreasing in r; as in the original model, because as players become less patient knowledge becomes less valuable, and so the agent is not willing to work as long to acquire it.
As before, the agent is asked to exert ine¢ ciently much e¤ort except at the terminal time. The target e¤ort distortion is now
where [ k] takes the place of because a greater distortion raises the rate of knowledge transfer and so has the disadvantage of frontloading the training costs that remain to be paid. To illustrate, when the agent exerts unskilled e¤ort only and the apprenticeship length is unconstrained, the target distortion is c 0 (l t ) @ @l y X; l t = T t :
This distortion depends only on the fraction of time that remains in the apprenticeship.
As a result, as k grows and the apprenticeship becomes longer, the e¤ort path is very similar to that in the original model, but is spread out over a longer period of time.
Conclusion
To conclude, we brie ‡y review our main …ndings. We have considered the optimal contract for a principal with commitment power to "sell" knowledge to a cash-constrained agent, or apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In these contracts, the agent works for the principal for low or no wages. Moreover, the principal requires the agent to work ine¢ ciently hard. When the production function leads the principal to require excess e¤ort in the skilled task, the period of apprenticeship decreases, while if the principal only ever requires excess e¤ort in the unskilled task, the length of the apprenticeship is una¤ected by the degree to which the agent is overworked. In some (but not all) cases, regulations that cap the agent's maximum e¤ort can raise surplus; e¤ort caps combined with limits on the duration of apprenticeship can do even better.
These results follow from our assumption that the agent is unable to commit to keep working for the principal after being trained. If the agent has full commitment power, the optimal contract will immediately fully train the agent, and specify the corresponding …rst-best level of e¤ort. The many complaints about slow training and excess e¤ort that we discussed in the introduction suggest that in practice the agent commonly does not have this sort of commitment ability.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that in some cases the agent's outside opportunity is lower than v(X) unless they are provided with a certi…cate of completion or letter of recommendation from the principal. Here the agent's desire to be certi…ed in e¤ect makes human capital at least partially …rm-speci…c. In the extreme case where the agent's outside option without certi…cate is v regardless of their level of training, the principal can implement the full-commitment solution with …rst-best e¤ort at all times. More generally, if the agent's outside option with knowledge X is 1 r v(X) with a certi…cate and 1 r maxfv(X) ; vg without it, one can show that the optimal contract has two phases.
Phase 1 resembles the solution for = 0: here knowledge grows over time, the agent's participation constraint binds at each instant, and the agent works ine¢ ciently hard until the last instant of the phase, which occurs when the agent is fully trained, that is when X t = X. Phase 2 corresponds to the solution for large : here the agent exerts …rst-best e¤ort, receives no additional training, and works for a time interval that makes the agent indi¤erent between obtaining the certi…cate or leaving with value v X ; so that the principal extracts the full value =r of the certi…cate from the agent. When is small, the solution is very similar to the solution in our main model; as grows, phase 2 grows longer and the solution moves closer to the case of full commitment.
Finally, we should point out that we have abstracted away from the idea that the agent learns by doing, so that the rate of knowledge transfer depends on the amount of skilled e¤ort, and also abstracted away from the possibility that the agent, principal, or both, are learning about the agent's ability over time. We have also assumed that there is only a single potential agent. If the principal can only train one (or a small number) of agents at a time, then training a given agent has an opportunity cost, and in some cases this might lead to "incomplete training,"that is the principal might switch to training a new agent before the current one acquires all of the principal's knowledge. All of these are important aspects of some apprenticeship relationships, and we plan to explore them in future work. 17 8 Appendix A1: Proof of Lemmas 1-3, and Proposition 1
Proof of Lemma 1. The conclusion of the lemma will follow from a series of claims. This proves part 1 of the lemma.
Claim 2 Any contract where W 1 > 0 is strictly dominated by some …nite-duration contract where W 1 = 0:
Proof. If contract S with potentially in…nite graduation date T prescribes W 1 > 0 and is not strictly dominated, by the previous claim it must have 0 (S)) > 0, so U 0 (S) < 1 r v (X 1 ). Now let T 0 2 (0; T ) satisfy
and consider a new contract S 0 where the agent earns zero wages, graduates at date T 0 with knowledge X 1 ; and for t < T 0 ;
By construction,
In addition, for t < T 0 ;
As a result, since the original contract satis…ed (2), the new contract satis…es (2) as well.
And since the new contract prescribes zero wages, it satis…es (3).
Finally, we have
where the strict inequality follows from the facts that v is strictly increasing and that X t < X 1 for all t 2 (T 0 ; T ) : Since U 0 (S 0 ) = U 0 (S) ; it follows that 0 (S 0 ) > 0 (S) ; and so S 0 strictly dominates S:
This proves the …rst clause in part 2 of the lemma.
Claim 3 Any in…nite-duration contract is strictly dominated by some …nite-duration contract with W 1 = 0:
Proof. In any in…nite-duration contract, constraint (2) at time 0 requires W 1 1 r max fv; v (X)g > 0; so the contract is strictly dominated by the previous claim.
Claim 4 Any …nite-duration contract with W 1 = 0 and X T < X is strictly dominated by some …nite-duration contract with W 1 = 0 and X T = X.
Proof. If a …nite-duration contract with W 1 = 0 has X T < X; then there is a time interval and e¤ort levels a 0 ; b 0 such that y(X 0 ; a 0 ; b 0 ) > v and e r v(X) (1 e r )c(a 0 + b 0 ) > v(X T ); and so the principal could obtain strictly higher pro…ts by extending the agent's contract to T 0 = T + paying no additional wages, setting X t = X T and (a t ; b t ) = (a 0 ; b 0 ) for t 2 [T; T 0 ); and setting X T 0 = X: Claims 3 and 4 prove the second clause in part 2 of the lemma.
Claim 5 Any contract is weakly dominated by some …nite-duration contract with X T = X and zero wages.
Proof. From Claims 3 and 4, we can restrict to …nite-duration contracts such that X T = X and W 1 = 0. Let S be one such contract, and consider an alternative contract S 0 that is identical to S except for the fact that all wages are zero.
The two contracts deliver identical pro…ts. In addition, for all t; where the inequality follows from the fact that W t 0 (from (3)) and W 1 = 0. As a result, U t (S 0 ) U t (S) and therefore S 0 satis…es (2) and (3) as well.
This proves the third clause in part 2 of the lemma and so completes its proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. We will show each clause of the lemma in turn.
Claim 6 Any contract is weakly dominated by a contract that sets the agent's participation constraints to hold with equality.
Proof. In a contract with zero wages, U t = e r(T t) 1 r v X R T t e r( t) c (a + b ) d ; which is strictly increasing (because v(X) > 0) and continuous. Thus if U t > 1 r v(X t ) for some times t; the contract with the same e¤ort path and terminal date, and X 0 t = maxfX t ; v 1 (rU t )g at all times will satisfy the participation constraints and give the principal a weakly higher payo¤ at each date. Moreover, if the times where U t > 1 r v(X t ) had positive measure, the new contract would give the principal a strictly higher payo¤ overall.
Claim 7 Any contract is weakly dominated by a contract where at each t total e¤ort a t +b t is allocated across tasks to maximize output.
Proof. Given any contract where at some times y t (X t ; a t ; b t ) 6 = y(X t ; (a t + b t )), consider the alternative contract where the time paths of knowledge and total e¤ort are the same but e¤ort is allocated to maximize output at each time. Since the agent's knowledge stock and e¤ort cost are the same, the participation constraints are still satis…ed, and the principal does at least as well, and strictly better if the times where y t (X t ; a t ; b t ) 6 = y(X t ; (a t + b t )) had positive measure.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose an optimal contract exists (otherwise the proposition is vacuously true). Now suppose S is optimal and contrary to the proposition suppose there exist a date z < T and a contract S ; with X z X z , such that S delivers strictly higher pro…ts than S from z onward, while satisfying the participation constraints (2) from z onward. Now consider a new contract b S that is identical to S for t < z and identical to S for t z: By construction, b S delivers strictly higher pro…ts than S while satisfying constraints (2) from z onward. In addition,
where the …rst inequality follows from the date z participation constraint and the last equality follows from Lemma 2.
In addition, for all 0 t < z we have
where the …rst two equalities follow from the fact that both S and b S prescribe zero wages before z: As a result, b S also satis…es all constraints (2) before z; a contradiction.
Appendix A3: Training cost
Here we derive the optimal contract in the extended model with training costs.
Lemma A3 In the model with training costs, the conclusions in Lemmas 1 and 2 remain valid.
Proof. With the exception of Claims 1 and 4, it is easy to see that the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 extend to this case. Claim 1 states that the principal obtains a strictly positive pro…t by contracting with the agent. To see why this is still true, consider a contract in which X 0 = X and X T = X; and at any time 0 t T e¤ort is l t = l F B (X t ) ; wages are zero, and the agent receives training dX t =dt such that v 0 (X t ) dX t dt = r v (X t ) + c l F B (X t ) = ry X t ; l F B (X t ) :
This contract satis…es the agent's participation constraints with equality at all times and delivers pro…ts T Z 0 e rt y X t ; l F B (X t ) k 1 r v 0 (X t ) dX t dt dt = T Z 0 e rt (1 k) y X t ; l F B (X t ) dt > 0:
Claim 4 states that any …nite-duration contract with W 1 = 0 and X T < X is strictly dominated by some …nite-duration contract with W 1 = 0 and X T = X. To see why this is still true, notice that if a …nite-duration contract with W 1 = 0 had X T < X; then the principal could obtain strictly higher pro…ts by extending the contract to date T 0 > T;
setting X T 0 = X; and for all T < t T 0 o¤ering the same arrangement as above.
It follows from this lemma that with the exception of the principal's objective, the optimal control problem is the same as in the original model. The principal's objective is
where the second term in the objective is the cost of the initial gift. The Hamiltonian is now H = e rt c 0 (1) otherwise.
Second, whenever the ex-ante participation constraint is slack ( = 0), Lemma A4 implies that 0 = 1 r k; and so the co-state evolution equation implies that 0 = 1 r [1 k] R T 0 [ t k] dt = 1 r k: Consequently, the optimal unconstrained terminal date T satis…es R T 0 [ t k] dt = 1 r : It follows from these two observations that after replacing t with [ t k] for all t; the proof of the present proposition is identical to the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.
